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The calls for "safe sex" education have increased recently in the wake of the
tragic revelation that the basketball mega-star, Earvin "Magic" Johnson, has
contracted the HIV virus, which leads to the Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome, or AIDS. Johnson acquired the virus during his sexual liaisons with
hundreds of women on road-trips, and while no mention is made of the fate of the
many women who may have contracted the virus from him, his celebrity and
personal charisdta have served as a rallying-point for advocates of "safe sex" as a
way to stop the spread of the HIV virus. Johnson himself is now understandably a
belated advocate of "safe sex."
Advocates of safe sex agree that sexual abstinence is the only foolproof way to
avoid contracting the HIV virus through sexual relations, but insist that it is
unrealistic to expect that people will simply desist from sexual activity for fear of
contracting HIV. Given this, they have turned their attention to "safe sex," the use
of a latex condom during sexual intercourse, as the most effective way both to
engage in sexual relations and reduce, though not eliminate, the chances of
contracting HIV. In heterosexual relations, the male partner's wearing of the
condom is beneficial to both himself and the female partner. If he is infected, it
prevents his virus-carrying semen from ever entering the vagina, such that any
lesions in the vagina or cervix of the woman will not become sites for the virus's
entry. If the female is infected, the coverage that the condom affords the male will
mean that any virus-carrying traces of blood or vaginal mucosa will not come
into contact with the penis, thus preserving the male from infection, since the
penis could itself have lesions that would be sites of the virus's entry.
Admittedly the principal target for campaigns of safe sex are those who engage
in extra-marital sexual relations, whether heterosexual or homosexual. Since the

82

Linacre Quarterly

-,

-.

Catholic Church's restriction of sexual activity to marriage endures, its own
obvious and simple response - critics say "simplistic" - to calls for safe sex is
itself a call to sexual abstinence until marriage for heterosexuals, or to perpetual
celibacy for confirmed homosexuals.! Traditional Catholic teaching thus
provides direction, albeit unpopular direction for many, to most cases that would
otherwise be subject to the practice of safe sex.
"Safe" Sex Not a Reality
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I personally very much support this stance, especially because the "politically
correct" presentation of safe sex seems to me to be quite misguided. With reports
of condom breakage of four to five percent, coupled with a general method
failure rate of twelve to fifteen percent - thus potentially yielding a combined
failure rate of up to twenty percent! - it is statistically quite possible that one in
five "safe sex" sexual unions is anything but safe. Even should someone insist
upon the value of condom usage in order to have "safe sex," or "safer sex," as it is
now more correctly called, even then the sexually active person must use a
condom in every single sex act. Not very likely. A young, libidinous population
that has been fed the message of "have sex with anyone you please, just wear a
condom" will be habitually quite unprepared, it seems to me, to deal with the
occasion for sexual activity when, alas, a condom is nowhere to be found. They
are quite likely to think that, just this once, they will do without. How many
people have gotten HIV because, just once, they did without? The safe sex
campaign is quite unrealistic, and it continues to refuse to hear the salutary
message that sexual abstinence is the only real way to safeguard the health of
those who could engage in sexual activity. But then, abstinence requires selfcontrol, something quite foreign to modem culture. Again and again, Catholic
teaching on the nature and purpose of human sexuality, with its resultant
teaching on homosexuality, pre-marital and extra-marital sex, should make more
sense to a population desperately in need of the wisdom it provides.
But what about the occasional, deplorable case of a marrioge in which one of
the spouses has become infected with HIV? That spouse will obviously not want
to infect the other spouse. Forgetting for a moment the foolhardiness of the
broader "safe sex" campaign, is there perhaps room in Catholic thought for the
practice of safe sex within a recognized marriage? David F. Kelly, the noted
moral theologian, thinks that there is room, and in a recent book makes his case
using the principle of doubl~fIect. In this note I will present Kelly's suggestion,
and raise some doubts about the solidity of his argument. I shall then close with
some broader comments of my own.
David KeDy's Suggestion

The book for which Kelly is best known in Catholic moral theology is his The
Emergency of Roman Catholic Medical Ethics in North America. a historical
presentation of medical ethics in America as a discipline undertaken by
Catholics. 2 As a medical ethicist himself, Kelly was an interested observer in the
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history and methodologies he reported, and he considered most of pre-Vatican II
Catholic medical ethics to have suffered from what he calls "physicalism," an
approach to moral evaluation that places emphasis - critics will say "undue"
emphasis - upon the physical character of an act. 3 An argument against the use
of a condom for contraceptive ends, based upon the intrinsic teleology of the
human reproductive organs, would be considered "physicalist." Kelly is not
alone, of course, in his dissatisfaction with physicalism,4 and he has come to favor
a system of moral evaluation he calls "personalism," which as near as I can tell is
another name for the system otherwise called "proportionalism."s Proportionalism as a moral method insists that the morality of an act be assessed on all
the factors of the act, including the agent's intention and present circumstances.
Assessing an act on the basis of its physical character alone, proportionalism
maintains, is only a very partial view of the whole act. Such an assessment, in fact,
is "premoral," and physical disvalues produced by an act may well be justifiable
if there is proportionate reason.
Kelly's latest book, Critical Care Ethics: Treatment Decisions in American
Hospitals, manifests his continued dissatisfaction with physicalism, and his
support of personalism. 6 The book itself is a collection of papers concerning
issues in critical care medicine, particularly issues of the withdrawal of treatment
in medically hopeless cases - parenthetically, I find Kelly's humane arguments
on this generally persuasive, materially speaking.7 It contains four appendices
that provide concrete suggestions to hospitals about various issues. Appendix D
(pp. 204-208), my concern henceforth, concerns AIDS, and the possibility of
distributing condoms in Catholic hospitals.
It would be very difficult to deal justly with the entirety of this appendix, since
in it Kelly is compelled to deal with a host of complicated, allied issues: the
"safety" of condoms in avoiding HIV transmission, the reasons for teenage sexual
activity, contraceptive mentality, material and formal cooperation, the politics of
the United States Catholic Conference, on and on. He is convinced that Catholic
hospitals may provide not only condom education to individuals but also the
condoms themselves (p. 205). And he thinks that even those who are leery of
such involvement can justify it according to the notion of material, that is, remote,
cooperation (p. 206).
My interest in Kelly's comments does not have so much to do with the
policy-decisions he is urging Catholic hospitals to make as it does with how he
thinks about, and describes, the sexual act in which a condom is used to avoid
HIV transmission. More than once Kelly says that the use of a condom during
sexual relations in order to avoid HIV transmission is "not contraceptive" (pp.
206, 208). When he justifies his point by noting that "contraception is only one of
the purposes of condom use; it is not the only purpose" (p. 206), one might think
that he has in mind the case, say, of a man who suffers from slight bladder
leakage, who wears a condom throughout the day in order to avoid spotting his
pants. But this is not what Kelly has in mind. He rather means to say that the use
of a condom during sexual relations in order to avoid HIV transmission is not
contraceptive because the couple who uses this method is intending to avoid HIV
transmission, not the conception of a child. "In most cases it is not at all a question
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of preventing pregnancy. Where contraception is intended - to prevent AIDS in
the baby - the purpose surely is not 'selfish contraception' or a 'contraceptive
mentality' .... This is an indirect contraception, and the prevention of AIDS
transmission is sufficiently important to give it moral warrant" (p. 206). In short,
for Kelly, the intention of the couple employing safe sex in marriage and that of
those who are trying to avoid a child are different, a difference that is morally
significant.8 And it is at this point that my reflection upon his suggestion leads to
some questions.
There is a very real sense, of course, in which the claim that "the intention of
the couple employing safe sex in marriage and that of those who are trying to
avoid a child are different" is true. The goal of each couple, what each is "after," is
different. In the former case the couple is "trying not to spread HIV," and in the
latter case the couple is ''trying not to have a child." And if one takes the term
"contraception" in strict accordance with its etymology, "against contraception,"
then Kelly's claim that safe sex in marriage is not contraceptive would seem to
ring true, if only because the couple practicing safe sex in marriage is in all
likelihood not even thinking about having a child. All the same, I wonder
whether it is not as easy as all this. I shall elaborate my misgivings shortly, but first
I need to mention briefly the notion of double-effect that is operating in the
background here.
This well-known principle is traditionally invoked to help assess the morality
of an act in which both good and bad results are foreseen. Though its remote
origin is thought to be Thomas Aquinas's treatment of killing in self-defense, or
his treatment of scandai,9 its more modem, codified treatment is generally
attributed to the French Jesuit, Johannes Gury (1801-1866).10 A reliable,
modem statement of the principle is as follows: l1
When an act is foreseen to have both beneficial and harmful results, the following
conditions must be met in order for it to be morally correct:
1. The directly intended object of the act must not be intrinsically contradictory to
one's own fundamental commitment to God and neighbor (including oneself).
2. The intention of the agent must be to achieve the beneficial effects and to avoid
the harmful effects as much as is possible (the harm must be only "indirectly"
intended).
3. The foreseen beneficial effects must be equal to, or greater than, the foreseen
harmful effects.
4. The beneficial effects must follow from the action at least as immediately as the
harmful effects do.

l

The principle of double effect depends heavily upon the notion of the agent's real
intention in an action and the role of the means in attaining the end. The doctor
confronted with the classic case of a pregnant woman's having uterine cancer is
able to justify the morality of the death of the unborn child because his action of
removing the entire uterus conforms to each of the conditions given in the
principle of double effect.
May, 1993
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Condition 1: His immediate deed or action, the removal of a uterus diseased
with cancer, is not contradictory to his relationship to God or
neighbor, but is an applicaton of the principle of totality,
according to which a lower function provided by a part of the
body may be sacrificed when diseased in order that the total
function of the whole body may continue.
Condition 2: The doctor undertakes the removal of the cancerous uterus to
prevent the cancer from metastasizing to other members of
the woman's body, thus saving her life. According to his
judgment, the entire uterus must be removed, the presence of the
unborn child in the uterus not withstanding, though he would be
delighted if the woman had not been pregnant.
Condition 3: The ultimate goal of the medical treatment, the saving of the
woman's life, stands in equal proportion, as life, to the lost life of
the child in the womb.
Condition 4: The medical goal of saving the mother's life is as immediately
accomplished by the removal of the uterus as is the death of the
child, since the one act of removing the uterus prevents both the
cancer's metastasis to other bodily members, and the access of the
unborn child to the continued nutrition and protection necessary
for its life.
Turning to the case at hand, it might seem that the principle of double effect as
traditionally described could be used to justify safe sex within marriage, since
what a couple intends in such sexual relations is the non-transmission ofHIV, and
not the non-conception of a child. Again, Kelly maintains that such sexual unions
are "not contraceptive," because their goal is saving lives, not preventing new
lives. The goals are different, then. And, Kelly claims, the prevention of
pregnancy is not the means to the saving of fife (p. 208).
Yet for all that, I think there is another sense in which it is true to say that the
couple contracepting and the couple practicing safe sex are actually intending the
very same thing if we really examine the actions performed in their concrete
reality. What has been missing thus far is the distinction between the proximate
and remote intentions in these acts, and this distinction must be borne in mind in
any attempt to use the principle of double effect.
It can be said that the "intention" of the contracepting couple and that of the
couple practicing safe sex is different, but only when we look to what the remote
intention of either couple is. True enough, each couple engages in certain
behavior in order to attain a certain goal, and the goals are different: preventing
pregnancy on the one hand, avoiding HIV transmission on the other. Yet when
we examine the behavior each couple performs in order to attain their remote
goal, we see that that behavior is exactly the same: the use of a condom in order
that the ejaculation that is the immediate goal of the sex act from the man's
perspective not enter the vagina, the ejaculate'S proper receptacle. This is the
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proximate intention of each couple, and it is identical. And this identical
proximate intention is the means by which each couple attains to its remote goal.
The contracepting couple's goal is attained because the fact that the ejaculate
does not even enter the vagina means that the spermatozoa contained in it cannot
make their way through the cervix up into the fallopian tubes to penetrate the
ovum. And the goal of the couple practicing safe sex is attained because the fact
that the ejaculate does not enter the vagina means that HIV-carrying semen
cannot come into contact with the vaginal walls or the cervix, and hence any
lesions that may be there, thus preserving the woman from infection.
The question in assessing the moral appropriateness of the use of condoms in
safe sex in marriage thus becomes whether the direct object of the act, its
proximate intention, is compatible with human intelligence and recognized
human needs. Here I am compelled to suggest that it is not. I do not see how we
can intelligently have as our proximate goal in the voluntary sex act the nondisposition of the semen in its proper receptacle when in fact the whole purpose
of the sex act, as a sex act, is precisely its proper disposition. Our employment of
condoms in the case of safe sex, and condoms, diaphragms, spermicidal foams
and jellies in the case of contraception, is implicitly a recognition of this very fact.
It might be objected that such a consideration of human sexual morality is
"physicalist," because it would seem to reduce the morality of an action to the
teleology of the sexual organs, thus approaching a Stoic notion of natural law.
This sort of objection, which Kelly himself intimates (p. 94), is made often
nowadays in reaction to Catholic teaching on the integrity of the sex act. In fact,
the objection is often made precisely on behalf of human intelligence, in order
that it be given its proper due as the distinguishing feature of human beings, and
not be held captive to the teleologies inherent in the body.
Yet if we assert an epistemology of moderate realism, according to which as
embodied spirits we know first and best material things, and our voluntary
actions are concerned with physical things, and proceed from and through
physical organs ~ the brain, our eyes, hands, the sexual organs - then it
becomes anachronistic to say that the moral assessment of human sexuality is
"physicalist" because it treats very seriously the inherent directedness of human
sexual architecture. For the moderate realist it is the body, our experiences with
it, and through it, that teaches us what we really are, and what we need in order to
be complete, to be happy.
On the other hand, according to a phenomenological epistemology proportionalism is very dependent upon Schelerian and Heideggerian
epistemology and metaphysics - the mind is cognitionally prior to the body and
is the ultimate source of meaning and importance for human moral conduct
(even conduct that concerns bodily activity that otherwise has its own
directedness), a cognitional priority that results in intuitions of "pure moral
values," not garnered from sensible experience, but from the mind's
apprehension of itself and its thought·forms. The difficulty this view presents for
moral methodology, however, is that once we deny the body a direct voice in
establishing what needs our decisions must bear in mind in the moral life, it
becomes difficult to discern criteria for including the body and its structures in
our decisions at all. 12
May, 1993

87

Author's Suggestion

I would rather suggest that our human intelligence, our intellect, whose chief
function is to discern and dwell upon order, tells us that our personal bodily
architecture is essential to what we are - it is true that we are not just bodies, but
we are at least bodies - and manifests to us our needs as embodied spirits created
by a God whose design of nature manifests in varying ways his splendor. In this
view, for us to use our sexual powers in a way contrary to their design is for us
thus to embrace an untruth about our relationship to ourselves as sexual beings
and to God Who desires that in understanding ourselves and other things in
nature we move towards having some understanding of Him, our final goal. 13
In the end then, my contention is that the suggestion that safe sex within
marriage could work within the context of the principle of double effect is
incorrect, since the proximate intention of the act of safe sex is the very same as
that of the contracepted act. Given that, I am compelled to suggest that safe sex
fails the first of the four conditions found in the principle of double effect, namely
that the directly intended action not be intrinsically contrary to one's
commitment to God and neighbor, since to perform the act we must embrace as
intellectually compatible the performance of the sex act, whose immediate goal is
the ejaculation of the semen in its proper site, while performing it in such a way
that that not really happen. And to do this, our mind, which sees the order of
things, must embrace disorder. And embracing intellectual disorder is the
antithesis of human fulfillment.
Notes
*Thanks are due to Fr Benedict Ashley, O.P., who read this article in its entirety, and who made
some very important suggestions. He is not, of course, responsible for what I say.
I. The latter claim is made in the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith's Lener to the
Bishops ofthe Catholic Church on the Pastoral Care ofHomosexual Persons (October I, 1986),
which drew much critical attention. For a volume of critical studies on the letter see The Vatican
and Homosexuality: Reactions to the "Lener for the Bishops ofthe Catholic Church on the Pastoral
Care ofHomosexual Persons. .. Of the twenty-five articles in the volume, only two, by Bishop John
Quinn and Benedict Ashley, explicitly support the letter. See Ashley's measured study,
"Compassion and Sexual Orientation," on pp. 106-111. Ashley notes that there is not necessarily a
clear distinction between heterosexuals and homosexuals, since some heterosexuals may have some
homosexual leanings, and vice versa.
2. David F. Kelly, The Emergence ofRoman Catholic Medical Ethics in North America: An
Historical, Methodological. Bibliographical Study (Toronto: Edwin Mellen Press, 1979).
3. Ibid., pp. 244-274, 416-429.
4. See, for instance, Charles E. Curran, Transition and Tradition in Moral Theology (Notre
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979), pp. 3-43; id., Tensions in Moral Theology (Notre
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1980), p. 76; id., Moral Theology: A Continuing Journey
(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1982), p. 144.
5. For a general overview of proportionalism and its intellectual origins, together with a
bibliography of the seminal articles and other sources, see Bernard Hoose, ProportioT/llJism: The
American Debate and Us EuropetUI Roots, (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 1987). One
could add to this John A. Gallagher's Time Past, Time FUlure: An Historical Study of Catholic
Moral Theology. (New Jersey: Paulist Press, 1990), although his stated intention is not to present
and explain proportionalism, to which he is an adherent
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6. David F. Kelly, Critical Care Ethics: Treatment Decisions in American Hospitals (Kansas
City: Sheedand Ward, 1991). I shall refer to this work henceforth by page number, in the body of
the text.
7. I do have concerns about the more methodological or formal character of Kelly's thinking,
as will be pointed out below. To anticipate, I am concerned that the strains of phenomenological
epistemology that "drive" the proportionalist system of moral evaluation render Kelly's account of
intention vague, leaving it bearing insufficient relation to the concrete causality of the actions we
actually perform.
8. Although Kelly himself is by no means one who necessarily opposes the use of
contraception, as is clear from pp. 93-94, and from a discussion I have had with him in November,
1991.
9. See SumTfUl theologiae, II-II, q. 64, a. 7 for self-defense, and ibid., q. 43, passim, for scandal.
The generally vague notion of "double-effect" seems in fact to have been a more or less common
instrument in dealing with particular cases in Thomas's time, and in fact in my studies of
quodlibetal questions dating from during Thomas's writing career I have encountered unpublished
questions in manuscripts that ask the very question "Should a doctor give medicine to a pregnant
woman knowing that it will kill the child, but without which medicine both will die?".
10. Johannes P. Gury, S.J., Compendium theologiae moralis (Lyon, 1850), vol. I, pp. 4-5:
"Licet ponere causam ad bonum effectum, quamvis ex ea sequatur effectus malus, si adsint
sequentes conditiones, scilicet: I) Si finis agentis sit honestus; 2) Si causa sit in se bona, vel
indifferens; 3) Si bonus effectus aeque immediate ac malus ex causa sequatur; 4) Si bonus effectus
malum saltern compenset." The literature on the principle of the double-effect is massive, but some
more recent articles are: Daniel F. Montaldi, "A defense of St. Thomas and the Principle of
Double Effect," Journal of Religious Ethics 1412 (1986) 296-332; Joseph M. Boyle, "Praeter
Intentionem in Aquinas," The Thomist 42 (1978) 649-665. The study to which all modem Catholic
scholarship refers is that of Joseph Mangan, S.J., "An Historical Analysis of the Principle of Double
Effect," Theological Studies \0 (1949) 41-61.
II. I am paraphrasing here the account of the principle found in B. A. Ashley's and K. D.
O'Rourke's HealthCare Ethics: A Theological Analysis. 3rd ed. (St. Louis: Catholic Health
Association, 1989), p. 185. See ibid., pp. 184-188 for a fuller treatment.
12. See Kelly, p. 94, where, in the context of claiming that the body's design and teleology
should not dictate the morality of an act, he nonetheless claims that "biological and physical aspects
are humanly significant." But how, and why, are they significant? Do they have a significance prior
to, and independent of, our investing them with other significance? Or do they have significance
because we grant it to them, i.e., because we "say so''? Kelly does not say, here or elsewhere in the
book.
The criticism I give here is basically a moral theologian's application to moral method of the
philosopher Etienne Gilson's criticism of Cartesian and post-Cartesian epistemology, found in his
marvelous book, The Unity ofPhilosophical Experience. 2nd ed. (New York: Scribner, 1965), pp.
196-197. Gilson's complaint is basically this: when one decides to begin philosophy or knowledge
as a pure mind, from within the mind, and not as an embodied spirit, whose source of knowledge is
material things, one has great difficulty ever really getting out of the mind to the world of material
things we think we know!
13. This is the sort of approach one finds in Benedict M. Ashley's Theologies of the Body:
Humtlnist and Christian (Braintree, Mass.: The Pope John Center, 1985), pp. 360-372.
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